Antitrust in 2018: The Meaning of Consumer Welfare Now by Hovenkamp, Herbert
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative
9-19-2018
Antitrust in 2018: The Meaning of Consumer
Welfare Now
Herbert Hovenkamp
Penn Law, hhovenka@law.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, and the Public Policy Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/58
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hovenkamp, Herbert, "Antitrust in 2018: The Meaning of Consumer Welfare Now" (2018). Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative. 58.
https://repository.upenn.edu/pennwhartonppi/58
Antitrust in 2018: The Meaning of Consumer Welfare Now
Summary
Modern antitrust policy follows the consumer welfare principle (CWP), the proposition that antitrust policy
should encourage markets to produce high output consistent with sustainable competition, and low prices.
The market dominance of giant firms such as Amazon, however, is opening the door to a reevaluation of this
antitrust standard, particularly from a new antitrust “movement” that has economic goals, such as protecting
small businesses and controlling runaway profits, that can be at odds with promoting low prices. Penn Law
and Wharton Professor Herbert Hovencamp evaluates the merits of three antitrust frameworks within the
context of the law and economic history. While he acknowledges that business can cause harm to the lives of
Americans in ways that extend beyond inflating prices—i.e., creating barriers to market entry, stifling
innovation, controlling information, or limiting wages—he argues that the CWP remains best positioned to
respond to antitrust problems, although it would benefit from technical improvements.
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Antitrust in 2018: The Meaning of 
Consumer Welfare Now
Herbert Hovenkamp, JD, PhD
The market dominance of American technology firms is giving rise to a call for 
antitrust intervention that is slowly but surely gaining momentum.
An article from The Wall Street Journal earlier this 
year reports some of the statistics: Amazon accounts 
for 75% of electronic book sales; Google and Facebook 
captured 63% of online ad spending in 2017; Apple 
and Microsoft currently supply 95% of desktop oper-
ating systems.1 These modern companies elicit com-
parisons, rightly or wrongly, to the monopolies of a 
century ago. “A growing number of critics think these 
tech giants need to be broken up or regulated,” in the 
way AT&T was, the Journal author observed. “Their 
alleged sins run the gamut from disseminating fake 
news and fostering addiction to laying waste to small 
towns’ shopping districts.” But the one thing they don’t 
run afoul of is the very heart of what actually informs 
modern antitrust policy: the consumer welfare prin-
ciple (CWP).2
The CWP stands for the proposition that anti-
trust policy should encourage markets to produce two 
things for the benefit of consumers: (1) output that is 
as high as is consistent with sustainable competition, 
and (2) prices that are accordingly as low. The CWP 
opposes competition-limiting cartels at one extreme 
and less competitive firms that rely on higher prices 
at the other. Market structure is relevant to antitrust 
policy only insofar as monopolies and oligopolies harm 
consumers by reducing output, stifling innovation, or 
SUMMARY
• Modern antitrust policy is based on the consumer welfare 
principle (CWP), which holds that markets should yield two 
things for the benefit of consumers: (1) output that is as high 
as is consistent with sustainable competition and (2) prices 
that are correspondingly as low. Under the CWP, prices faced 
by consumers are paramount.
• This approach to antitrust policy, however, is currently being 
called into question by two other schools of thought that deny 
the primacy of low prices as an antitrust goal. 
• On the right, the CWP faces a competing technical approach to 
antitrust policy marked by an emphasis not on consumers but 
rather on assessing the “general welfare” of consumers and 
producers in the marketplace. The more significant challenge 
to the CWP, however, is coming from the left, in the form of 
a new antitrust “movement” that has a particular aversion to 
large firms such as Amazon and Microsoft, and an interest 
in economic goals such as protecting small businesses and 
controlling runaway profits that can be at odds with promot-
ing low prices.
• This brief summarizes these three approaches to antitrust policy 
and enumerates why the current CWP remains best positioned 
to respond to antitrust concerns, while also suggesting how 
implementation of the CWP could be tweaked to better protect 
consumer interests.
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yielding higher prices.3 Factually, the 
CWP can tolerate very large firms, 
such as Amazon and Microsoft, pro-
vided that their gains are passed on to 
consumers, and historically it has.
Whether the CWP will remain 
central to the future of antitrust is 
under question, though. The CWP is 
now navigating between two hazards, 
both of which threaten the impor-
tance of low prices as an antitrust 
goal.4 On the right, it faces a compet-
ing technical approach to antitrust 
policy marked by an emphasis not 
on consumers but rather on “general 
welfare.” This standard dominated 
antitrust policy in the 1980s and early 
1990s, and it is best identified with 
Robert Bork and his important work, 
The Antitrust Paradox, in which he 
permits efficiency claims as an anti-
trust defense, even when the chal-
lenged practice leads to higher prices 
and causes consumer harm.5 For Bork, 
“consumer welfare” referred to the 
sum of the welfare, or surplus, enjoyed 
by both consumers and producers, 
or perhaps even by all of society. His 
general welfare understanding was 
built on a strong faith that various 
practices produced cost savings or 
other efficiencies, whether or not these 
were provable, as well as considerable 
doubt that a large menu of practices 
(e.g., predatory pricing, vertical merg-
ers) caused genuine competitive harm. 
In the process he gave clout to an 
antitrust standard that is very difficult 
to administer and underdeterrent over 
a wide range of practices.  As a result, 
many businesses favor it.
On the left, the CWP faces 
a challenge from a new antitrust 
“movement.” The goals of this move-
ment have been variously defined as 
combatting industrial concentration, 
limiting the economic or political 
power of large firms, correcting the 
maldistribution of wealth, control-
ling runaway high profits, increas-
ing wages, and/or protecting small 
business. None of those goals is new.6 
They have appeared and reappeared in 
the history of United States anti-
trust policy. Among the articulated 
goals of this movement, however, low 
consumer prices often goes unmen-
tioned. Proponents, some of whom 
are referred to as “neo-Brandeisians” 
(after Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis), often regard low prices as 
an undesirable outcome, at least when 
they come from large firms at the 
expense of higher cost, smaller rivals. 
Overall, the movement is not enthu-
siastic about the use of economics in 
antitrust and appears to believe that 
economics should either be subordi-
nated to political priorities or aban-
doned entirely.7 Accompanying this 
belief comes very considerable sus-
picion about markets generally, quite 
aside from monopoly.8 This movement 
exhibits strong ambivalence about 
innovation, particularly when the 
firms who engage in it become large,9 
and it believes that exclusionary strat-
egies such as predatory pricing are a 
common device by which firms create 
dominant positions10 or force targeted 
firms to merge.11 
Of these three approaches to 
antitrust policy—consumer welfare, 
general welfare, and the new anti-
trust movement—the current CWP 
remains best positioned to respond 
to the problems of increasing market 
power going forward, although it 
would benefit enormously from  
some technical improvements that 
I will recommend at the end of this 
Issue Brief. 
AN ACCURATE 
UNDERSTANDING OF 
CONSUMER WELFARE
“Consumer welfare” as it is properly 
used today refers to the welfare of 
consumers-as-consumers, pure and 
simple. Speaking objectively, consumer 
welfare is improved by high output 
 1  Greg Ip, “The Antitrust Case Against Facebook, Google and 
Amazon,” Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2018.
 2  This Issue Brief is based on the following two papers: 
Herbert Hovenkamp, “Whatever Did Happen to the An-
titrust Movement?” available at https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=3097452 and Herbert Hovenkamp, “Is Antitrust’s 
Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?” available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3197329. 
 3  Herbert Hovenkamp and Carl Shapiro, “Horizontal Mergers, 
Markets Structure and Burdens of Proof,” 127 YALE L.J. 
1996 (2018).
 4  The expansive, vague language of the antitrust laws, par-
ticularly the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, gives rise to 
the feeling that the antitrust laws can do all things for all 
people, and over the decades that is precisely how some 
constituencies have viewed them. 
 5  Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with 
Itself (1978).
 6  See Brandeis’ papers dating back to the 1912 Presidential 
election, collected in Louis Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness: 
Miscellaneous Papers of Louis Brandeis (Osmond K. Fraen-
kel, ed. 1934).
 7  E.g., Zephyr Teachout and Lina Khan, “Market Structure 
and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power,” 9 Duke J. Const. 
L. & Pub. Policy 38 (2014).
 8  See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman, Democracy Against Domina-
tion, 10-13 (2017).
 9  E.g., Barry C. Lynn, Cornered: The New Monopoly Capital-
ism and the Economics of Destruction, Ch. 6 (2010).
 10  E.g., Laura Phillips Sawyer, American Fair Trade: Propri-
etary Capitalism, Corporatism, and the “New Competition,” 
1890-1940 at 277-279 (2018). 
 11  Lynn, supra note 9.
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and low prices, as well as high quality. 
The most explicit case for application 
of the CWP is in merger law under 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
which expressly embrace a consumer 
welfare principle to the extent that 
they tie merger policy to the effects 
on output and consumer prices.12 But 
misunderstandings about definition—
often the result of confusing the con-
sumer and general welfare standards—
have complicated the debate about 
how to improve antitrust policy and 
have affected even Supreme Court 
usage of the term. The Supreme Court 
has never categorically embraced any 
particular definition of consumer wel-
fare, even though it has used the term 
several times.13 
It should be said that no particular 
technical welfare test—whether con-
sumer or general—answers antitrust’s 
hard questions about when a particu-
lar practice should be condemned. 
One must also have a substantive 
theory about when practices such as 
aggressive price cutting, tying, exclu-
sive dealing or mergers are anticom-
petitive and when they are beneficial. 
The problem, however, is not merely 
that the general welfare test trades 
off presumed consumer harm against 
presumed producer benefits. It is 
that Bork gave the benefit of the 
doubt to efficiency claims while being 
extremely skeptical about claims 
of competitive harm.14 In fact, for 
practically every practice other than 
naked price fixing, Bork emphasized 
their efficiencies or harmlessness, 
while rejecting nearly all theories of 
competitive harm. The result is that 
general welfare tests can tolerate a 
significant amount of market power in 
the economy. 
There is at least a temporal link 
between Bork’s more general wel-
fare test and the significant rise of 
monopoly power in the United States 
economy. The 2010 Merger Guide-
lines, unlike Bork, take the risk of 
high market concentration seriously. 
Once a prima facie case has been 
made, the Guidelines require strong 
evidence of efficiencies that could not 
be obtained except by the merger and 
that are of sufficient magnitude to 
render temporary any predicted price 
increase.15 These are rarely found. 
In contrast to the administrative 
challenge of evaluating claims of “effi-
ciency,” the most significant benefit 
of embracing the modern consumer 
welfare test is that it makes assessing a 
transaction relatively straightforward. 
One only needs to know whether out-
put has gone down or price has gone 
up. That is the only issue to be consid-
ered, and the size of the output reduc-
tion or price increase does not matter. 
Further, there is nothing to trade off. 
Relative to any general welfare test, 
the administrative cost savings from 
a consumer welfare test seem to be 
substantial. 
The main challenge facing the 
CWP, however, is not the one coming 
from the technical and monopoly-
friendly right, but the one from the 
political and large firm-allergic left. 
Ironically, both sides reject the impor-
tance of low consumer prices and high 
output.16 They simply do so for vastly 
different reasons.
THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE: 
A NEW ANTITRUST 
“MOVEMENT” AND ITS 
FLAWS
Over the last fifty years, antitrust 
has become much more technical, 
particularly in areas such as merger 
enforcement and exclusionary behav-
ior. Today the concern about market 
power concentration is robust, and 
many observers focus on a specific 
indicator: high price-cost margins.17 
As firms face fewer competitors, 
price-cost margins tend to rise. And 
recent literature suggests that market 
power, as measured by price-cost mar-
 12  U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §§1, 6, 7, 9, 10 (2010), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-
guidelines-08192010. 
 13  Five majority opinions speak of consumer welfare. Four 
additional usages of the term are in dissents. In Reiter 
v. Sonotone Corp., the Supreme Court held that end use 
consumers had standing to pursue price fixing, making it 
the ultimate consumer welfare decision. 
 14  Bork made no denying of the fact that he fundamentally 
disbelieved in the theory of oligopoly. As a result, merg-
ers should be considered harmless unless they created 
a single-firm monopoly. He also took extremely benign 
positions on all vertical practices, concluding that the best 
rule for them should be virtual per se legality except in a 
small group of cases thought to facilitate collusion. And he 
believed that predatory pricing is so unlikely to succeed 
that the best rule for it should be per se legality. 
 15  Guidelines, supra note 12.
 16  Protagonists in the neo-Brandeis movement sometimes 
even write as if low prices are the evil to be avoided.
 17  A price-cost margin increases when the difference be-
tween the price a firm charges to consumers and the 
marginal cost of producing a good or service (i.e., the 
competitive price) grows. Higher margins are indicative of 
greater market power.
 18  Jan de Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, “The Rise of Market Power 
and the Macroeconomic Implications,” NBER Working Pa-
per No. 23687 (Aug. 2017). 
 19  Ibid. at 16. (Noting the profit rate relative to GDP grew 
fourfold during the period 1980-2014.) 
 20  The same consumer welfare principles that apply in prod-
uct markets should be applied to labor markets as well – 
NOTES 
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 Industry (# of companies) Market Share
 Search Engines (3) 98.5%
 Arcade, Food & Entertainment Complexes (2) 96.2%
 Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (4) 94.7%
 Satellite TV Providers (2) 94.5%
 Soda Production (3) 93.7%
 Food Service Contractors (4) 93.2%
 Sanitary Paper Product Manufacturing (3) 92.7%
 Lighting & Bulb Manufacturing (3) 91.9%
 Tire Manufacturing (4) 91.3%
 Major Household Appliance Manufacturing (4) 90.0%
Source: IBISWorld available at http://news.cision.com/ibisworld/r/top-10-highly-concentrated-industries,c9219248.
TABLE 1 TOP 10 HIGHLY CONCENTRATED INDUSTRIES (2012)
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gins, is in fact rising.18 The increase 
began to occur in the early 1980s, at 
about the same time as the Reagan-
era antitrust revolution, with its 
underdeterrent, general welfare bent.19 
Changes in antitrust policy may 
be a factor in this rise of price-cost 
margins, but they are far from the only 
explanation. For instance, during this 
same period, the economy became far 
more digitized and information-based. 
To the extent the rise in margins 
results from an increase in fixed costs, 
it is not an antitrust problem. Also, 
as a result of decades of anti-union 
politics and legislation, wages have 
been suppressed in favor of company 
profits. Most aspects of this are not 
an antitrust problem either, although 
there are strong arguments for pay-
ing more attention to labor market 
concentration, particularly in merger 
cases.20 But to whatever extent anti-
trust policy has directly resulted in 
increases to price-cost margins, there 
is no viable reason for eschewing the 
modern CWP—which is much less 
tolerant of market power than the 
general welfare standard employed 
by the DOJ and FTC in previous 
decades—in favor of the neo-Brandeis 
movement’s unclear interpretations of 
consumer welfare.
One advantage of CWP is that 
its goals are empirically quantifiable. 
The correct rules for determining 
what is best for consumers are empiri-
cally determined, moving targets, 
which change not only with further 
economic theory and empirical study, 
but also with changes in production 
and transportation technology, as 
well as demographics.21 To date, the 
strongest claim of the neo-Brandeis 
movement—its assumption that 
individuals in our society would really 
be better off if they lived in a world 
characterized by smaller firms and 
higher prices—remains unverified. 
The neo-Brandeisians still face the 
formidable task of providing empiri-
cal evidence that this is true in a 
society where everyone is a consumer 
and consumers vote mainly with 
their purchasing choices. The goals of 
this movement (e.g., fairness22 and 
small business protectionism) are not 
measurable and are fundamentally 
inconsistent, although their contra-
dictions—like the one between the 
competing priorities of small business 
protection and consumer welfare—are 
rarely exposed. 
Also missing at this stage is any 
serious discussion of remedies, except 
for some very general statements to 
the effect that perhaps the best fix for 
Amazon is regulation.23 On the one 
hand, the neo-Brandeis movement 
is highly suspicious of government, 
and particularly of its power over the 
economy. It observes, quite correctly, 
with a little modification to account for the fact that workers 
sell, rather than purchase, their labor. The best understand-
ing of consumer welfare is as promoting markets in which 
output of both product and labor is as high as competition 
permits. For more, see Ioana Marinescu, “The Other Side 
of a Merger: Labor Market Power, Wage Suppression, and 
Finding Recourse in Antitrust Law,” Penn Wharton Public 
Policy Initiative Vol. 6, No. 3 (2018).
 21  The area that exhibits this most strongly is mergers, with 
enforcement policy going from severely overdeterrent in 
the 1960s to underdeterrent today. 
 22  “Fairness” was an antitrust goal of the Democratic Party 
in 2016, according to its party platform. As an antitrust 
concern, fairness means nothing without a reference point 
or set of measurement tools. For reference, the full text of 
major party platforms back to 1840 can be found at http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php.
 23  Lina Khan, “Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,” 126 Yale L. J. 
710, at 797-801 (2017).
 24  Lynn, supra note 9, 24, 99-102. 
 25  Refocusing antitrust policy so as to make political theory 
the driver would actually return us to cycles of special 
interest capture and protected local monopoly. Consider 
the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, which prohibited price 
discrimination, effectively curbing the power of a firm’s 
size. The historical record of this law shows one of the 
strongest instances of legislative capture by a special inter-
est group in the entire body of antitrust law. Because the 
statute applied only to “sales,” it fostered a great deal of 
vertical ownership integration.
 26  Brick and mortar booksellers, for example, have suffered, 
but their injury has resulted largely from a technology 
– direct electronic distribution – that has made them su-
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that government is prone to corrup-
tion and special interest domination.24 
At the same time, however, members 
of the movement argue for much 
more heavy-handed government 
regulation, and not on behalf of con-
sumers.25 Meanwhile, as this move-
ment strongly emphasizes the role of 
politics in economic change, it pays 
little attention to changes in technol-
ogy that provide at least as powerful 
an explanation.26 
As decades of antitrust litigation 
have shown, antitrust is not good 
at balancing. The advantage of the 
CWP is that economics gives us a set 
of tools for assessing the conditions 
that are conducive to high output and 
lower prices, and thus for examining 
the practices claimed to challenge 
them. That is not to say that employ-
ing these tools is easy, but over the 
years we have been able to improve 
their usefulness. 
In contrast, the broader goals 
identified by movement antitrust, 
including control of political power 
and wealth equality, job provision and 
wages, and protection of small busi-
ness, are difficult to assess and weigh, 
and they often operate at cross-
purposes with one another. The CWP, 
however, actually speaks to some of 
these goals, at least indirectly.27 For 
example, although wealth equality 
and job creation are not separately 
articulated goals of antitrust under the 
CWP, competitive markets are very 
likely conducive to more appealing 
distributions of wealth than monopo-
lized ones. Unless proponents of the 
antitrust movement provide metrics 
for their goals, it will remain difficult 
to justify a move away from the CWP 
as the guiding force of antitrust policy.
So what should antitrust do about 
rising price-cost margins? Should it 
entertain calls for radical change, or 
hold fast to the CWP? It is worth 
noting that two of the principal 
targets of movement antitrust today 
– Google and Amazon – are not 
significant contributors to this rising 
margins phenomenon. Google’s most 
common price to consumers is zero, 
and Amazon’s margins are among the 
lowest in all retailing.28 Certainly, big 
business can cause harm to the lives of 
Americans in other ways than through 
competitive pricing. But these ways 
need to be articulated, supported by 
evidence, and then sorted into those 
things that are conceivably within the 
domain of antitrust and those that are 
not. Promiscuous application of the 
antitrust laws so as to make big firms 
smaller and prices higher could cause 
irreparable harm, not only to consum-
ers, but also to the entire economy. 
Objectively, embracing an ideol-
ogy of supporting lower output and 
higher prices would be a disaster for 
the American economy, which is in 
competition with other world econo-
mies that is fiercer than at any point 
in the postwar period. The danger that 
the political process will force govern-
ment policy off the rails is real. The 
only workable option is to reinforce 
the CWP.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
IMPROVING ANTITRUST 
POLICY—WITHOUT A 
MOVEMENT
The way to repair deficiencies in anti-
trust law today is not to resort to an 
undisciplined set of goals that provide 
no guidance and could do serious 
harm to the economy. Rather, it is 
to make ongoing adjustments in our 
technical rules of antitrust enforce-
ment that reflect what research and 
experience have taught us. The anti-
trust laws can reach nearly every form 
of anticompetitive behavior, provided 
that they are interpreted flexibly.
Although this Issue Brief is a 
defense of the CWP, antitrust could 
protect consumer interests better than 
it has in recent years. The CWP is not 
perfluous. It is not antitrust’s purpose to force distribution 
channels to maintain institutions that no longer perform a 
valuable function.
 27  Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, “Antitrust, Competi-
tion Policy, and Inequality,” 104 Geo. L.J. Online 1 (2015). 
(Discussing, inter alia, the relationship between market 
power and inequality and offering several proposals for 
using the antitrust laws to address inequality issues.) 
 28  To be sure, either company might be doing anticompetitive 
things.
 29  E.g., Khan, supra note 23 at 710-711. (Associating the 
consumer welfare principle with an excessive focus on 
short run concerns.)
 30  Marinescu, supra note 20.
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without its flaws. It often appears to 
be underdeterrent to anticompetitive 
behavior because of its insistence on 
due process and rationality, admin-
istrability and clear proof.29  For 
example, too many merger approvals 
have been followed by price increases, 
and current legal standards make 
predatory pricing almost impossible to 
prove.  By contrast, though, movement 
antitrust often makes claims that are 
impossible to deliver, or adopts specu-
lative, unprovable theories about com-
petitive harm. As a result, movement 
antitrust tends to be overdeterrent. 
But in light of the CWP’s record 
of underdeterrence, I offer the fol-
lowing recommendations. First, legal 
scholars should work to devise better 
remedies for mergers discovered to 
be illegal. Since judges tend to fol-
low scholarship in antitrust more 
than in other legal areas, this is an 
important endeavor. At the same 
time, the CWP would benefit from 
new scholarship driven by the need 
to strengthen merger standards—
especially for vertical mergers and 
large tech firm acquisitions of smaller 
highly innovative rivals—as well as 
the need to amend proof requirements 
for exclusionary practices. Addition-
ally, the CWP should be adapted to 
enable appropriate evaluation of the 
labor effects of mergers. In general, 
anticompetitive practices affecting 
labor markets need to be taken more 
seriously.30 While antitrust policy is 
certainly not the only reason wages 
fail to keep up with economic growth, 
its lack of attention in this area is at 
least a partial contributor. Finally, on a 
technical level, several practices, such 
as tacit collusion, predatory pricing 
law’s recoupment requirement, and 
the status of indirect purchaser plain-
tiffs, should be re-examined.
One place that CWP proponents 
and the neo-Brandeis movement can 
agree is that concentration does mat-
ter, although they currently disagree 
about how it should be included in 
the calculus of competitive harm. The 
antitrust concern with high concen-
tration is a means to an end—namely, 
control of higher prices—rather than 
an end in itself. The important point, 
however, is that established antitrust 
tools are up to these tasks. Prop-
erly applying the consumer welfare 
principle, not jettisoning it, is the way 
forward for antitrust law.
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
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